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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Nathan R. Bagshaw appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine, claiming evidentiary error by the district court and fundamental error 
in relation to the prosecutor’s closing arguments. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
During the evening of October 27, 2014, Deputy Humphreys pulled over a 
speeding vehicle.  (Tr., p.121, Ls.11-23.)  Bagshaw was a passenger in the vehicle.  
(Tr., p.124, L.6 – p.128, L.5.)  The officer noticed that Bagshaw was smoking and had a 
pack of cigarettes in his hand.  (Tr., p.125, Ls.16-24.)  Bagshaw was attempting to hide 
his face from the officer as the officer made contact with the driver.  (Tr., p.123, Ls.4-6.)  
The officer asked for Bagshaw’s name and date of birth, and Bagshaw gave him a false 
identity.  (Tr., p.123, L.13 – p.124, L.13.)  The officer asked Bagshaw to exit the vehicle 
for further questioning.  (Tr., p.124, Ls.14-17.) 
As Bagshaw exited, rather than join the officer at the back of the vehicle, he 
hurried to the front of the vehicle.  (Tr., p.126, L.20 – p.127, L.3.)  The officer asked 
Bagshaw to come to the back of the vehicle, and he complied.  (Tr., p.127, Ls.3-15.)  
The officer confronted Bagshaw about his false identification, and Bagshaw ultimately 
admitted his true identity.  (Tr., p.127, L.16 – p.128, L.5.)  The officer ran Bagshaw’s 
name through dispatch and it came back with several active warrants.  (Tr., p.128, 
Ls.13-23.)  Deputy Humphreys placed Bagshaw under arrest.  (Tr., p.128, Ls.24-25.) 
After placing Bagshaw under arrest, the officer returned to the vehicle and told 
the driver that he was free to go.  (Tr., p.129, L.18 – p.130, L.8.)  After the vehicle drove 
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away, Deputy Humphreys noticed a pack of cigarettes on the ground near where 
Bagshaw had been after he was asked to exit the vehicle.  (Tr., p.130, Ls.9-15.)  Inside 
the cigarette pack, officers found a small baggy filled with a white crystal substance.  
(Tr., p.132, Ls.1-4.)  The substance was sent to the Idaho State Lab and tested positive 
for methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.132, Ls.12-19; State’s Ex. 3.) 
The state charged Bagshaw with possession of methamphetamine.  (R., p.30.)  
Bagshaw pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to trial.  (R., pp.40-43, 138-42.)  
Following the trial, the jury found Bagshaw guilty of the possession charge.  (R., p.136.)  
The district court entered judgment against Bagshaw and sentenced him to a unified 
term of seven years with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.162-64.)  
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court placed Bagshaw on 
probation for a period of five years.  (R., supp., pp.4-5.)  Bagshaw filed a timely notice of 
appeal from his judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.166-67.) 
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ISSUES 
Bagshaw states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting the audio of 
the traffic stop, in which Mr. Bagshaw lied about his name and birthday, 
because it was not relevant to the possession charge and was unduly 
prejudicial? 
 
II. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by telling the jury that Mr. 
Bagshaw knew where to walk to get out of the view of the dash camera? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 
 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Bagshaw failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting the audio portion of the traffic stop into evidence? 
 
2. Has Bagshaw failed to show fundamental error entitling him to review of his claim 
of prosecutorial misconduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Bagshaw Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Admitting The Audio Portion Of The Traffic Stop Into Evidence 
 
A. Introduction 
In a motion in limine prior to trial, Bagshaw sought to exclude the audio portion of 
his traffic stop, during which he lied to the officer about his identity.  (R., pp.94-98.)  
Bagshaw argued that the only reason he lied to the officer was to avoid an arrest 
warrant, and that his misrepresentation of identity was therefore irrelevant to his 
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine and would “unfairly prejudice his 
case.”  (Tr., p.1, L.9 – p.2, L.15; p.93, L.7 – p.95, L.3.)  The state argued that the audio 
was probative of Bagshaw’s consciousness of guilt and should therefore be admitted.  
(Tr., p.88, L.7 – p.92, L.18.)  After reconsidering its ruling, the district court recognized 
that “evidence can be admissible for more than one purpose,” and went on to explain:  
“The evidence is certainly relevant to any claim that [Bagshaw] did not want to be 
arrested on the warrant.  It’s certainly also relevant to the circumstantial evidence of 
guilt that he—consciousness of guilt.”  (Tr., p.97, L.21 – p.98, L.2.)  Recognizing its 
discretion, the district court admitted the audio portion as circumstantial evidence of 
Bagshaw’s guilt.  (Tr., p.98, Ls.3-15.) 
On appeal, Bagshaw argues that the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting the audio from the traffic stop.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11.)  Application of the 
correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however, shows no abuse of discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The relevancy of evidence is an issue of law subject to free review.  State v. 
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993).  Once relevance has 
been established, the district court’s determination that the evidence’s probative value is 
not outweighed by unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 603, 809 P.2d 455, 464 (1991). 
 
C. The Probative Value Of Bagshaw’s Lying To Officers About His Identity, Which 
Shows His Consciousness Of Guilt, Is Not Outweighed By Unfair Prejudice 
 
The Rules of Evidence generally govern the admissibility of all evidence in the 
State of Idaho.  State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 240, 220 P.3d 1055, 1060 (2009).  
“I.R.E. 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if admitted for the purpose of showing ... 
consciousness of guilt.”  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 279, 77 P.3d 956, 968 
(2003).  Behavior demonstrating a consciousness of guilt encompasses a wide range of 
acts, which include the “use of false identification or aliases, or otherwise 
misrepresenting one’s identity.”  29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 318 (2014); see also United 
States v. Carrillo-Valenzuela, 177 Fed.Appx. 763, 764 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Evidence of 
false names is generally admissible to show consciousness of guilt or intent to evade 
law enforcement.”).  Because Bagshaw’s repeated lying to the police about his identity 
was indicative of his consciousness of guilt, it was relevant. 
On appeal, Bagshaw asserts that his misrepresentations were not relevant to his 
prosecution for possession of methamphetamine because he was only lying about his 
identity to avoid an arrest warrant.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)  This argument is 
contrary to the applicable legal standards and therefore fails.  Bagshaw’s argument 
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requires the jury to accept his explanation for his actions, something the jury was not 
required to do.  Moreover, even if the jury did accept that Bagshaw was motivated at 
least in part by a desire to avoid arrest on a warrant, that would not be exclusive of 
additional motivations, such as being searched incident to that arrest.  Whether 
Bagshaw may have had additional, “non-inculpatory” reasons for lying to the police is 
therefore not relevant to the admission of evidence which establishes his consciousness 
of guilt.  “When evidence that is offered to establish consciousness of guilt also supports 
non-inculpatory inferences, this goes to the weight, not the relevance of the evidence.”  
State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 917, 354 P.3d 462, 480 (2015) (citing Sheahan, 139 
Idaho at 279, 77 P.3d at 968). 
Apparently recognizing that the evidence at least could have been probative of 
his consciousness of guilt, Bagshaw nevertheless argues that the audio recording 
should have been excluded for being unfairly prejudicial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11.)  
This argument also fails.  Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence may be 
excluded if, in the district court’s discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice substantially 
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.  State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 
P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870, 264 P.3d 975, 977 (Ct. 
App. 2011).  “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a 
defendant’s case.  Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an 
improper basis.”  Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870, 264 P.3d at 977.  “Under the rule, the 
evidence is only excluded if the probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.  The rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of 
relevant evidence.”  State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 
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(1990) (emphasis in original).  Absent a clear abuse of discretion in weighing potential 
prejudice against relevance, a district court’s determination under Rule 403 will not be 
disturbed on appeal.  State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991). 
Contrary to Bagshaw’s argument, evidence that Bagshaw lied to police is not 
unfairly prejudicial and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that 
evidence.  Evidence showing a consciousness of guilt is evidence of the fact of guilt 
itself.  United States v. Guerrero, 756 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984) (citations 
omitted).  Evidence indicative of a defendant’s guilt is a proper basis on which to 
premise a finding of guilt.  Therefore, while the state agrees that evidence showing 
Bagshaw lied about his identity when confronted by police is prejudicial—because it 
demonstrates Bagshaw’s consciousness of guilt—the evidence is not unfairly 
prejudicial.  Because Bagshaw has failed to show any unfair prejudice arising from 
admission of the traffic stop’s audio recording, he has failed to show any abuse of the 
district court’s discretion.1 
Furthermore, even if the court had abused its discretion by admitting the audio 
recording of the traffic stop, any error in admission would necessarily be harmless 
because there is additional evidence that Bagshaw lied to police, which Bagshaw has 
not challenged on appeal.  During Bagshaw’s trial, Deputy Humphreys testified that 
Bagshaw initially lied about his identity.  (Tr., p.123, L.13 – p.124, L.13; p.127, L.16 – 
p.128, L.5.)  While Bagshaw sought to exclude this testimony through his motion in 
                                            
1  Though the state believes there is no potential for unfair prejudice in admitting the 
audio recording, even if there were, such would not substantially outweigh the 
recording’s highly probative value as evidence of Bagshaw’s guilt. 
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limine below (see Tr., p.9, Ls.13-23), he has failed to challenge its admission on appeal 
(see Appellant’s brief, pp.8-11). 
Moreover, the evidence of Bagshaw’s guilt was overwhelming:  While Bagshaw 
was inside the vehicle, the officer saw him holding the same red and white cigarette 
carton that was later discovered on the road near where Bagshaw had been standing.  
(Tr., p.142, L.24 – p.144, L.6; compare State’s Ex. 1 (red and white cigarette carton) 
with Tr., p.125, Ls.23-24 (officer testifies, “I noticed a pack of cigarettes in his hand, a 
red and white pack of cigarettes.”).) 
The district court correctly concluded that the audio evidence which showed 
Bagshaw’s consciousness of guilt was relevant, and properly exercised its discretion in 
admitting the audio portion of the traffic stop.  Bagshaw has failed to show an abuse of 
the district court’s discretion.  Even had the court abused its discretion, any error in 
admitting the audio recording—where unchallenged evidence also shows Bagshaw was 
lying to the police and the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming—would necessarily 
be harmless.  The district court should be affirmed. 
 
II. 
Bagshaw Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Review Of His Claim 
Of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
A. Introduction 
At trial, Bagshaw’s defense against the methamphetamine possession charge 
was that the unweathered and clean cigarette carton containing methamphetamine, 
found on the ground near where Bagshaw stood during a traffic stop, did not belong to 
Bagshaw.  (See Tr., p.173, L.19 – p.175, L.12.)  The state’s theory of the evidence was 
that the container in fact belonged to Bagshaw and that he tried to get rid of it when he 
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was asked to exit the pulled over vehicle.  (See Tr., p.170, L.19 – p.173, L.2.)  During 
closing arguments, the prosecutor explained: 
What we do know is that Nathan Bagshaw was the passenger of 
that van on that evening. 
 
What we do know is that Nathan Bagshaw got out of the van and 
walked to the front of the van and paused.  He walked to the front of the 
van out of the light and out of the camera view. 
 
What we do know is that he has been pulled over several times, is 
his testimony, and he knows better where to walk to get out of the view of 
the camera. 
 
We know what he paused for.  We know that his last-ditch effort on 
getting rid of the methamphetamine was his only hope on not getting 
caught.  This is all we know, and this is what we’ve learned today. 
 
(Tr., p.170, L.22 – p.171, L.9.) 
For the first time on appeal, Bagshaw claims that the prosecutor’s statements 
constitute misconduct.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.)  Application of the correct legal 
standards to the record, however, shows that Bagshaw has failed to show error, much 
less fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved issue. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 
245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). 
 
C. The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct 
For the first time on appeal, Bagshaw asserts that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct when he drew the inference that Bagshaw knew how to avoid being viewed 
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in dash cameras from his many times being pulled over and the fact that he got out of 
view of the dash camera for a period of time during his traffic stop.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.11-13.)  Because he did not preserve this issue below, he is required to show 
fundamental error on appeal.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.  To establish 
fundamental error, 
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as 
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not 
harmless. 
 
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  Because review of the record shows that the prosecutor’s 
argument was not inappropriate, Bagshaw has failed to show error, much less 
fundamental error entitling him to review of this unpreserved claim. 
First, Bagshaw argues that the prosecutor’s statement constituted misconduct 
because it was not factually supported.  (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)  Prosecutors enjoy a 
considerable amount of latitude in closing argument and may fully discuss the evidence 
and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.  State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 
P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (emphasis added).  The prosecutor’s comment, that Bagshaw 
knew where to stand to avoid the dash camera, is an inference drawn from the 
evidence.  The evidence established that when asked by the officer to exit the vehicle, 
rather than join the officer at the back of the vehicle, Bagshaw hurried to the front of the 
vehicle.  (Tr., p.126, L.20 – p.127, L.3.)  Bagshaw’s movement was not casual, but 
appeared suspicious.  (See id.)  And Bagshaw’s testimony confirmed that he had been 
in several traffic stops.  (See Tr., p.159, Ls.13-20.)   
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Though Bagshaw’s attorney was free to argue other inferences, the evidence 
supported the prosecutor’s inference that Bagshaw deliberately hurried to the front of 
the vehicle because, having been in several traffic stops, he knew he would be out of 
view of the dash camera.  As noted above, Bagshaw was attempting to subvert the 
police investigation—both by giving a false name and by his apparent efforts to avoid 
being recorded while discarding contraband during the traffic stop.  That Bagshaw went 
off camera deliberately is an inference that can be drawn from the evidence; arguing 
that inference was therefore not error, much less fundamental error. 
Bagshaw also claims on appeal that the prosecutor’s comments were 
inappropriate because “the prosecutor’s claim improperly implied that Mr. Bagshaw’s 
earlier traffic stops led to criminal charges serious enough that he viewed dash camera 
videos, and thus knew exactly where the cameras are located and what they film.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)  Even assuming the prosecutor’s inference, drawn from the 
evidence presented at trial, could make such an implication, that could not constitute 
fundamental error.  To meet the burden of fundamental error, Bagshaw must show that 
the error is clear on the record.  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.  An “implied” 
error, by definition, cannot be “clear on the record.” 
Bagshaw has failed to show that, by arguing an inference from the evidence 
during closing argument, the prosecutor erred, much less committed misconduct arising 
to the level of fundamental error.  Having failed to show fundamental error, Bagshaw is 
not entitled to review of this unpreserved issue on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Bagshaw’s conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine. 
 DATED this 3rd day of May, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer_ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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